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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, which 
is a regional organisation established in 1981. The thesis compares the 
theories of EU integration with the realities of the OECS and makes a 
determination of the type of Governance structure that the OECS has. 
This comparison is done, by examining the organs of the OECS; the 
OECS Assembly, the Council of ministers, the OECS Authority, the 
economic affairs council and the OECS Commission. There is also an 
examination of the institutions of the OECS; the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank, The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and The Eastern 
Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority. The study is in essence a 
comparative regionalism examines the levels of integration that exist at 
the European Union level vis a vie the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States. It takes a look at the political economy of the OECS and compares 
it to that of the EU in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion that answers the 
question as to whether the governance structure in this regional 
organisation is intergovernmental or neo-functionalism. 
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Research Question 
 
To what extent can the process of regional integration which is occurring 
within the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States, be accurately 
viewed as regionalism and to what extent can it be said that the 
organisation is governed by neo-functional or intergovernmental modes 
of decision-making? 
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Methodology 
 
This research focuses on the examination of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean states to determine whether or not this regional organisation 
can be included among the more established and written about regional 
organisation such as the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur etc.  The research is 
exploratory with a view to making tentative findings at the end but 
ultimately with a view to pursuing further and deeper research in this area 
in the future. The research employs the use of both primary and 
secondary sources of data. 
 
Primary Sources  
The main primary source of information for this research is a 
videoconference interview conducted by this researcher with interviewee 
His Excellency Ambassador Ellsworth John, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Ambassador to the OECS and Commissioner to the OECS 
Commission.  The contents of this interview forms part of the body of 
this research. 
 
Secondary Sources  
The secondary sources of information include book, articles and other 
sources of information relative to the theories of integration as well as 
publications on the topic of OECS integration.  The information from 
these forms a substantial part of the body of this research. 
 
Limitations 
The main limitation encountered was that of a paucity of materials, 
specifically academic on the OECS.   
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Unfortunately this organisation despite its history as well as its successful 
results from its on going attempts at regional integration has not attracted 
much interest from scholars on the topic of regional integration.  This 
lack of publication presented a significant challenge to this research.   
 The lack of support structures provided by Khazar University also 
proved to be quite a challenge in completing this research.  The lack of 
access to proper online databases of journals and other scholarly material 
severely limited the depth to which this research could have gone since 
the research method required access to materials that could be used to 
substantiate the research.  This is an area that Khazar University must out 
of necessity, address with urgency if students are to be expected to 
undertake quality research at this level. 
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Introduction 
 
The OECS is a regional organisation comprising 9 member states of the 
Eastern Caribbean that has been in existence since the signing of the 
treaty establishing that organisation in 1981.  This organisation with 
headquarters in the member state of St. Lucia has among its objectives; 
the promotion of cooperation, unity and solidarity among the member 
states; the harmonising of foreign policy among and to promoting 
economic integration among its member states. 
 The composition of the membership of the OECS ranges from the 
full member states of Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, the Multi island state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines to the 
Associate member states of Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands (BVI) 
making it a total of 9 members in this organisation. 
 The treaty establishing the OECS, referred to as the Treaty of 
Basseterre, outlines the principles and rules governing the performance of 
the organisation and serves as a constitution of sorts for the organisation. 
Its sets out the functions of the organisation, and establishes the organs of 
the organisation as well as the institutions that form the governance 
structure of the organisation. Since the establishment of the OECS in 
December of 1981, there has been significant growth in the organisation 
experienced through deepening of cooperation and the strengthening of 
the governance structure of the organisation. In August 2011, the treaty 
establishing the OECS Economic Union (referred to as the Revised 
Treaty of Basseterre) came into force, establishing a new set of areas of 
cooperation between the member states.    
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Some of the new dimensions of the revised treaty include the free 
movement of persons, a signal towards the deeper integration of the 
peoples of the region that would invariably erode restrictions on the 
movement of nationals from one member state to another. 
 In this context, it must be remembered that the member states of 
the OECS are individual islands and hence share no common borders but 
are in fact separated by sea, suggesting a unique dimension of the notion 
of free movement to that of the EU where countries share borders. 
 This study would examines the aspects of the OECS, from its 
origin to its present day structure, analysing its organs and its institutions 
to determine their roles in the governance structure of the organisation. It 
would further seek to analyse those organs and institutions within the 
context of the theories of regionalism, specifically neo-functionalism and 
inter-governmentalism, to determine the most relevant theory that would 
explain the governance structure of the OECS.  Finally, the study would 
compare the OECS with the EU analysing the areas where they are 
similar and their points of departure within the context of the established 
theoretical framework. 
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1. Historical Overview of the OECS 
 
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is a regional 
organisation in the Caribbean that is made up of 7 original member states; 
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  This organisation came into being by the 
signing of the treaty establishing the OECS that came into force on the 5
th
 
day of October 1981.  According to Barrett (1986) the establishment of 
the OECS was a positive response by the governments of the 7 
microstates of the Eastern Caribbean to the challenges of administration 
brought on by their small sizes.   
 The establishment of this organisation through the signing of the 
treaty was not the first attempt at integration by these islands, their effort 
at integration dates as far back as 1968.  This initial attempt at integration 
was through an earlier arrangement that was called the Eastern Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCOM) that was established in June 1968 and had as 
its main objective, the achievement of social and economic development 
for the peoples of the Islands (Barrett 1986). The signing of the original 
treaty that established the OECS came approximately 13 years later in 
1981, building on the objectives of the previous arrangement but 
additionally promoted cooperation and unity at regional and international 
levels among other objectives (Barrett 1986).  
 The original treaty signed that came into force in 1981 is 
commonly referred to as the Treaty of Basseterre, so named after the 
capital city of St. Kitts and Nevis, the member state where the treaty was 
signed. The islands involved shared many geographical, historical, 
cultural features that provided a basis for the effort at integration. Many 
of these islands were former British colonies that had been offered or had 
attained their independence during a 10-year period between 1974 and 
 12 
1983 respectively.  Their independence at the time exposed them to the 
realities of a changing world and rendered them vulnerable to the 
economic and other realities that came with the removal of support from 
their colonial masters. 
 These islands were faced with the decisions at that time that 
impacted their chances of survival and consequently had to act in a 
manner that protected the embryonic economies and fragile democracies 
of these recently independent former British colonies.  Byron (1999) 
suggests that the motivation for the renewed attempts at integration 
among member states of the OECS, which would in reality build on the 
previous attempts dating back as far as 1961, were both economic and 
political. Byron further stresses that the islands had become accustomed 
to aspects of cooperation in areas such as joint diplomatic arrangements 
which would not have been so successful had they been attempted 
independently (Byron 1999) offering an indication of the level of 
cooperation that already existed and presenting elements of what was 
already a form of functional cooperation if not already integration. 
 The treaty of Basseterre as signed in 1981, signalled the beginning 
of a newer, much deeper form of integration and cooperation between the 
7 states that were signatories to the treaty. This was not the first attempt 
at some level of regional cooperation or an attempt at integration between 
these Caribbean islands. There had been an attempt earlier dating back to 
the to the 1960‟s where the countries of the region made and attempt at 
regional integration under a federal type system that included more than 
the 7 islands of the OECS.  Girvan (2012) suggests that a long history of 
integration initiatives exists as far back as colonial times when territories 
were grouped together because they were cheaper to administrate as a 
group by their colonisers.  This led to a type of integration between 1958 
and 1962 (inclusive) referred to as “The West Indian Federation” that 
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Girvan (2012) went on to describe as “a hybrid” because according to 
him, this is was a “colonial federation on the path to decolonisation”. In 
this instance of attempted integration, the integration movement suited 
the British colonisers who were at the time anxious to be rid of the 
financial responsibility associated with the islands (Girvan 2012). 
 The documented failure of the West Indian federation and the 
casualties associated with its eventual demise in 1962 provides the 
context and the background to the initiative of the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States in 1981. In this second attempt almost 20 years 
later: the initiative didn‟t include some of the original countries that were 
involved in the West Indian Federation, who had by this time become 
independent countries. The focus this time was the group of smaller 
islands in the Eastern Caribbean, a grouping that brought together the 
Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands.  
 It would appear that insularity had already become a destructive 
element in the process of integration as far back as the attempt at 
federation with the comparatively larger islands being blamed for the 
failure of the integration movement.  The larger islands that were 
involved in the West Indian Federation were seen as responsible for the 
failure at federation and were excluded from this new initiative at 
integration. According to Bishop and Payne (2010) Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago had experienced economic growth from their natural 
resources of bauxite and oil respectively and this created the notion that 
their survival as individual states was possible. Those countries 
eventually broke away from the integration movement and sought 
independence on their own and the colonies of Barbados and British 
Guiana followed suit (Bishop and Payne 2010).  This resulted in the 
eventual break up of the federation and the temporary halt at regional 
integration.  It was therefore understandable why the countries of the 
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Windward and Leeward Islands that had decided to engage in another 
attempt at regional integration were reluctant to include those islands that 
were seen as a major part of the reason for the failure of the initial 
regional integration attempt. 
 The countries that form the Leeward and Windward islands were 
among the smallest and least economically developed of countries that 
were included in the West Indian federation. When that attempt at 
integration failed, those countries were left in a precarious situation since 
their survival seemed rather uncertain as individual states.  Writing on the 
issue of the formation of the OECS, Williams (1985) indicated that the 
geographical factor of their small sizes and their economic vulnerability, 
stemming form the absence of any natural resources had led them to take 
part in the West Indian federation.  He went ton further to suggest that 
with the break up of the Federation, the 8 member states of the Eastern 
Caribbean territories, opted for the creation of a truncated federation in 
their sub-region, which never came into effect after one of the islands; 
Barbados decided to seek their independence individually. (Williams 
1985). 
 The sub-regional integration that came to be known as the OECS 
started before the 1981 signing of the treaty of Basseterre that saw all 
seven Eastern Caribbean island becoming party to the treaty that also 
included associate members that were not yet independent.  The 
governments of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-
Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines according 
to Williams (1985) together decided to embark on a more “intensive 
integration effort on a less geographic scale”. This development led to the 
formation of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market, a sub-regional 
agreement within the framework of a wider less intensive integration 
effort at a common market. 
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The ECCM served as a precursor to the formation of the OECS, which 
came in 1981 with the signing of the treaty of Basseterre.  This attempt at 
regional integration was at the time the most intense and deepest form of 
integration tried in the Caribbean.  Put another way, the OECS was and 
has been represented as the deepest form of political and economic 
integration, experienced by former British colonies of the Eastern 
Caribbean (Byron 1999).   
 The need for integration between the Eastern Caribbean islands 
grew out of necessity to tackle the growing economic pressures of the 
time that were facing the vulnerable economies.  These small islands 
were experiencing increased pressures brought on by the global political 
realities, to pool resources in a manner that would be of greater benefits 
for the countries.  Even though some of the islands had gained their 
independence from Britain, starting with Grenada in 1974, the most 
aggressive pursuant among the islands, for national independence saw the 
virtue of some form of regional integration.  Byron (1999) posited that 
the case for sub-regional integration within the OECS grows stronger in 
light of the growing pressures from the global political economy and that 
even the most “individualistic and secessionist” units were convinced of 
the need to continue within a sub-regional framework cooperation.  
 All this was to lay the groundwork for what was to become the 
OECS, a grouping of Eastern Caribbean countries, (except Barbados) 
whose integration would come to represent the most intense and most 
comprehensive effort ever attempted within the region.  The next section 
would discuss whether this integration process in the Eastern Caribbean 
can be classified as regionalism and take its place in the literature among 
those regions that attract interest among the scholars and writers on 
regional integration and regionalism. 
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2. The OECS an Example of Regionalism?  
 
 Since its formation in 1981 by the signing of the treaty of 
Basseterre, the OECS has functioned as an organisation made up of the 
islands of the Eastern Caribbean.  The purpose and functions of the 
OECS are outlined in this treaty and serves as the supreme document and 
authority for this organisation.  The question however, is whether the 
OECS as is defined by the treaty and by the way it operates in practice is 
consistent with the scholarship that exists regarding regionalism.   
 It would be of benefit to begin this analysis on the OECS by first 
establishing what a region is, before attempting to determine if 
regionalism exists within the OECS.  Many definitions of a region exist 
in scholarship, each of which focuses on a different aspect to arrive at the 
specific definition.  Some of the aspects considered in the formation of a 
definition of a region are geographical location, while other definitions 
focus on cultural and other shared identities, some go even further 
making it less complicated by focusing on shared interests as pursued 
through trade agreements.  This is not a straightforward exercise since 
according to Hurrel (1995) the term region is quite ambiguous and debate 
on a definition has not yielded a consensus as a result of the contested 
nature of the terrain.  Mansfield and Milner (1999) added that with over 
50 years of research on economic regions, neither economists nor 
political scientists have been able to make any headway at arriving at a 
definition of “region”.  Yet to embark on any significant research on the 
OECS, it is important that a theoretical basis be laid for the examination 
of this organisation.  
 The OECS remains one of the few organisations that can draw 
from all of the definitions of “region‟ available as its formation and 
composition contains elements of them all.  
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For example, Mansfield and Milner (1999) suggest that a region is often 
described as a group of countries that share a similar geographic space or 
are located in the same geographic area.  If this definition was to be 
applied to the OECS, then the fact that the countries that make up this 
organisation are washed by the Eastern Caribbean Sea, seems to support 
this definition.   
 Other definitions however have been adopted that place less 
importance on the geographical location of the members of the region, 
placing this importance instead on other factors.  One such definition 
emphasises the significance of identity and other connections and reduces 
the role of geographical factors.  Manson and Milner (1999) drawing on 
the example of France and the Francophone countries of Northwest 
Africa that are often referred to as a regional grouping, contends that to 
be a region implies more than just close physical geographical proximity.  
This idea is supported by Fawn (2009) who includes the elements of 
culture, economics, language and politics to that of proximity in 
determining a region.  In this submission, it was argued that in some 
cases the cultural connections (especially in instances where the members 
of the region were once a part of the same empire) such as language can 
provide even a stronger bond that proximity (Fawn 2009).  Using this 
second definition the OECS again can be seen an example of this type of 
region. 
 Whether the definition of geographical proximity is used or the 
other elements of identity and connection are added, the OECS can be 
referred to a region.  The OECS satisfies the first requirement of close 
geographical proximity since all the members states are located close to 
each other in the Caribbean Sea, but it also possess the other elements in 
that there are shared cultural, political and economic values.  
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In this case, all member states of the OECS were former British colonies, 
with English language being the language spoken by all and in cases 
where residue of other brief colonial masters like France, still remain, 
there are similarities there as well; for example Dominica and St Lucia 
speak a dialect or French patois.  The OECS can therefore be explained in 
a manner suggested by Fawcett (2004), who drawing on an earlier 
definition by Joseph Nye, summarised a region as a group of states that 
are linked together by both a geographical relationship and a degree of 
interdependence.  It can be therefore logically concluded that this region, 
the OECS possesses more elements of a region than any other region in 
the world based on the definitions. 
 Having established that based on the literature, the OECS is indeed 
by all standards a region, it is now important to determine whether there 
is an active attempt at regionalism.  To determine this however, it would 
be instructive to identify the definition of regionalism that would be used 
to arrive at this conclusion. 
 Like the term region, the concept of regionalism is no less fraught 
with ambiguities and diversity in an attempt at arriving at a consensus. 
The study of new regionalism and the existing literature provides a 
variety of definitions, but in many instances the variety may serve to 
increase the confusion or complexity that surrounds this concept instead 
of offering clarity.  To simplify this concept, Fawcett (2004) suggested 
that regionalism is a project that implies a policy position of states and 
non-state actors to cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given 
region with the aim of pursing and promoting common goals in one or 
more areas.  This definition suggests that regionalism requires a 
collection of various actors working together to achieve a set of 
predetermined goals.  It should be noted that this definition uses the term 
region loosely as opposed to an area, building on the previously accepted 
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definition of a region.  Drawing on previous bodies of scholarship, Fawn 
(2009) suggested that regionalism can be defined as exploring 
“contemporary flows of trans-national cooperation and cross border flows 
through comparative, historical and multilevel perspectives”, concluding 
similarly that regionalism refers to a set of activities undertaken by 
various actors in various ways at different times.  Soderbaum (2008) 
attempts to simplify the definitions or at least add some clarity to it by 
suggesting that regionalism is generally a more formal, state-led project 
at regional integration. This interjection serves well to provide some 
cohesiveness to the previous definitions and offers a more workable 
meaning to the concept of regionalism. 
 An examination of the definitions used exposes a number of 
similarities in the intention or rather the principle of the concept of 
regionalism that is being defined.  All of the definitions refer to 
cooperation among a variety of actors, namely states as well an as non-
state actor.  They both refer to coordination in one form or another with 
one definition speaking to the establishment of a single agreed upon 
policy to achieve mutual goals.  The next step therefore is to determine 
whether or not the elements of regionalism as outlined in the agreed upon 
definitions exist within the context of the activities of the OECS allowing 
for this organisation to be included among the regions that form part of 
the existing literature of regionalism. 
 The notion that the European Union is the best example of 
regionalism that exists is one that is generally accepted by political 
scientists and those researching the issue of regional organisations.  Many 
of the authors point to the EU as a point of reference both from a 
theoretical standpoint as well as from the practical functioning of the 
organs and institutions that form part of this organisation.  De Lombaerde 
et al (2010) in reference to the explosion of the variety of regionalism 
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projects existing suggested that the EU through its deepening and 
widening is the most pervasive example of regionalism.   
Many other researchers support this view and consequently, the EU is 
used in many cases as the ultimate example of a regionalism project.   
 The literature that exists on regionalism and region formation 
speaks to other examples including NAFTA, MERCUSOR, ASEAN with 
some details, but very little is often mentioned of the OECS.  Fredrik 
Soderbaum (2008) for example, presenting on global comparative 
regionalism, examined examples of regionalism in Europe, East Asia, 
The Americas (which included the Caribbean and Latin America) and 
Africa.  Soderbaum examined the existing debate about the regionalism 
project occurring and mentioned the attempts at a state-led project that 
existed in those regions.  Of note when the Americas were examined, 
mention was made of NAFTA, MERCOSUR, FTAA, even the failed 
LAIA was mentioned, but no mention of the 32-year old organisation 
comprising of 9 small Eastern Caribbean Islands.  What is the reason for 
this relatively low interest in the OECS regionalism project?  Could the 
answer lie in the suggestion that scholars and political scientists are 
unaware of the deepening and widening occurring within this region or 
can it be that the EU because of its position occupies the interests of these 
scholars?  Finally, can it be suggested that the project taking place in the 
OECS with the policies pursued do not suggest regionalism?  
 This section would address the situation of the absence of 
significant comparative literature on the regionalism project in the OECS 
from the position of the last question and will thus examine a few of the 
policies of the OECS undertaken in the context of the definitions of 
regionalism adopted earlier.  With the acceptance of the definitions of 
regionalism offered by Fawcett (2004) and Fawn (2009), the attempt 
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would be made to answer the question whether the OECS has its own 
regionalism project. 
 The OECS since its formation in 1981 has sought actively to 
coordinate policy and cooperate through state-driven initiatives at the 
highest level which; according to Soderbaum (2010) is one of the 
identifying characteristics of regionalism.  The Treaty of Basseterre that 
established the OECS provides for a number of institutions that are 
critical to the function and governance of the organisation. The following 
is a direct excerpt from the 1981 Treaty: 
 
“ARTICLE 5 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ORGANISATIONS 
 
There are hereby established the following principal institutions through 
which the 
Organisation shall accomplish the functions entrusted to it under this 
Treaty: 
(a) the Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States of the 
Organisation 
(referred to in this Treaty as "the Authority"); 
(b) the Foreign Affairs Committee; 
(c) the Defence and Security Committee; 
(d) the Economic Affairs Committee; and 
(e) the Central Secretariat. 
The institutions of the Organs shall perform the functions and act within 
the limits of the 
powers conferred upon them by or under this Treaty and by the Protocols 
thereto. They 
may establish such subsidiary institutions as they deem necessary for the 
performance oftheir functions”. 
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An examination of the institutions provided for by the treaty clearly 
shows a significant involvement of the state from the level of the Head of 
Government to other areas of policy and decision-making.  These 
institutions would be examined in greater detail later in this section of 
this paper, but are introduced now to develop the idea that there is an 
active attempt by the state to coordinate policy and cooperate, which is a 
distinguishing feature of regionalism. 
 The Revised Treaty of Basseterre (2010) made a number of 
changes to the original treaty, which included the changing the 
designation of the above mentioned institutions to “organs” as well as 
changing the replacing some of the original organs with new ones. Below 
is an excerpt from the 2010 Revised Treaty of Basseterre: 
 
“ARTICLE 7: ORGANS OF THE ORGANISATION 
 
7.1 There are hereby established the following principal Organs through 
which the Organisation shall 
accomplish the functions entrusted to it under this Treaty - 
(a) the Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States; 
(b) the Council of Ministers; 
(c) the OECS Assembly; 
(d) the Economic Affairs Council; and 
(e) the OECS Commission. 
7.2 The Organs of the Organisation shall perform the functions and act 
within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon them by or under this Treaty and by the Dispute 
Settlement Annex and the Economic Union 
Protocol.  
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They may with the approval of the OECS Authority establish such 
subsidiary Organs as they 
deem necessary for the performance of their functions”. 
 
 Apart from the changes mentioned above where the previously named 
institutions were changed to organs with a number of changes to those 
institutions, the Revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) also speaks to a 
number of new institutions that were developed to assist in the 
coordination of policy in a number of areas.  As outlined by the treaty of 
Basseterre, the institutions that are charged with various responsibilities 
within the OECS are: 
 
“ARTICLE 6: INSTITUTIONS OF THE ORGANISATION 
 
6.1 There are hereby recognised as Institutions of the Organisation - 
(a) the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court; 
(b) the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank; and 
(c) the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority; 
provided that this Article does not impair any powers or jurisdiction of 
any of those Institutions. 
6.2 The OECS Authority may by unanimous decision add to the list of 
Institutions in Article 6.1 any inter-Governmental entity whose functions 
relate at least to all the full Member States”. 
 
  Article 4.2 of the Revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) outlines 24 
policy areas that the OECS as a regional organisation would work 
towards harmonising among member states.  Some of these areas would 
be decided at the level of the Authority while others remain the 
responsibility of the established institutions of the OECS.   
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The main thrust of policy coordination among the member states that are 
headed or driven by those institutions listed above are: 
1. Monetary policy, through the development of the currency union 
and the establishment of the ECCB, the OECS has adopted a single 
monetary policy that is the responsibility of the ECCB.  The 
Monetary council is the highest decision making body in this 
regard and provides guidelines on matters of monetary and credit 
policy to the bank.  This coordination of monetary policy has led to 
the use of a single currency; the Eastern Caribbean Dollar (EC$ or 
XCD) which is used in the member states of the OECS. 
(Information taken from www.eccb-centralbank.org)  
2. Civil Aviation in the OECS is coordinated regionally through the 
ECCAA a body charged with the formulation implementation and 
monitoring of civil aviation policy for the region. According to the 
ECCAA‟s website, the organisation is a fully autonomous self-
financed body that is responsible for the formulation of a 
uniformed and collective approach to regulate civil aviation 
activities in the OECS. (www.eccaa.aero) 
3. Legal and judicial, through the establishment in 1967 of the ECSC, 
which is the supreme court of the 9 members of the OECS. This 
court has unlimited jurisdiction in the Member States and is 
endowed by law to formulate the rules of court, regulating the 
practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. 
(www.eccourts.org)  
 The areas listed above are the three major areas of policy 
coordination undertaken by the OECS as outlined by its treaty.  
Commenting of the role of the ECCB Nicholls (2001) saw its purpose as 
enshrined in its constitution as protecting the external value of the Eastern 
Caribbean dollar, which is the regions currency, within the operational 
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framework (the currency board) outlined by the monetary constitution.  
He goes on to suggest that this monetary constitution has served the 
region well and has provided stability and confidence through domestic 
prices and provided long standing monetary and financial system stability 
(Nicholls 2001).   
 The cooperation in the judiciary dates as far back as 1967 when 
according to Don Mitchell CBE QC (2007) with the establishment of the 
West Indian Associated States Supreme Court.  The former colonial 
masters of these islands set up this court as they offered “associated state” 
status to these islands, a prelude to their eventual independence.  The 
jurisdiction of the court was outlined in the written constitutions given to 
the islands by Britain and was not left to the voluntary responses of each 
island. (www.eccourts.org) 
 While these major areas of policy coordination capture immediate 
attention, the OECS through the secretariat and other agencies also 
coordinates other areas.  The coordination of the telecommunications that 
led to the liberalisation of that sector was undertaken by a regional 
agency that coordinates the legislation in 5 of the OECS countries. The 
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL) which was 
established by it own treaty in the year 2000 has coordinated the 
telecommunication legislation in the member states of Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Other areas of policy coordination and management include 
environment management and policy coordination through the OECS 
Environmental Unit and the common bulk purchasing of medication 
through the OECS Pharmaceutical Corporation. This allows for the 
region to realise economies of scale through the pooling of resources, the 
benefits of which are then passed on to the citizens of each member 
territory through reduced cost of pharmaceutical products. 
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 The OECS is more than just a group of geographically bounded 
territories but are by the very construct of the organisation a working 
example of regionalism. This project of policy coordination and 
cooperation among the 9 islands of the Caribbean has all the hallmarks of 
regionalism.  The initiative is driven by the state and is intended to 
facilitate greater cooperation and trans-border movements between 
members in achieving common predetermined goals.  More than most of 
the existing often-cited examples of regionalism, with the exception of 
the EU, the OECS as a regional organisation contains more of the 
elements that should make it a relevant example of new regionalism.  
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2.1 The impact of the Institutions of the OECS on regionalism   
 
 Arising from the revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) that 
established the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Economic 
Union were a number of institutions that were different from those that 
were initially established by the previous, original 1981 treaty that 
established the OECS.  These included at least two institutions had been 
already established and functioning within the OECS at the time of the 
signing of the original treaty but were for whatever reason not included in 
that original treaty.  As identified earlier, the OECS Supreme Court 
existed in one form or another since 1967, making that institution older 
that the OECS.  The other institution that was in existence before the 
establishment of the OECS was the ECCAA albeit under various 
management structures until 1983 when it became an institution of the 
OECS.  These two institutions along with the ECCB make up the 
institutions of the OECS as outlined by the Revised treaty of Basseterre 
(2010) and function within the organisational structure to assist in the 
realisation of its goals.  Exactly what impact theses institutions have on 
the regionalism project of the OECS would now be examined in detail. 
 To determine whether or not these institutions through their 
functions impact in anyway the project of regionalism within the OECS, 
their roles must be examined within the context of the theoretical 
framework.  If regionalism is agreed on for the purpose of this research to 
be the state-led policy of cooperation and coordination of strategy among 
countries within a particular geographic location in an effort to achieve 
common goals, then there must be an examination of the way these 
institutions help to achieve those objectives.  
 The countries of the Leeward and Windward islands, now the 
OECS had been sharing a common currency since 1965 pursuant to the 
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Eastern Caribbean Currency Agreement (Gilmore 1985).  This currency 
was later to be managed by the ECCB upon its establishment in 1983 
under a single monetary policy implemented and monitored by that 
institution of the OECS.  The ECCB is the monetary authority of the 
OECS and is responsible for deciding the monetary policy of the ECCU 
through the existence of this central monetary authority (www.eccb-
centralbank.org).  The ECCB recognises its role in the process of 
integration of the OECS and states in its Vision Statement that “the bank 
aspires to be an advocate for the ECCU‟s regionalisation initiatives”. 
 The ECCB is one of the 4 multistate central banks in the world and 
was established at a time when none of the two that were already in 
existence (the Bank of Central African States and the Central Bank of 
West African States) was responsible for multistate supervision (World 
Bank 2008).  For the bank to be effective in its multistate supervisory 
role, a number of acts had to be harmonised firstly to give uniformity 
within the legislation of the individual member states as well as the 
establishment of the central bank‟s act itself.  In recognition of this, there 
exists two main legislative components in the ECCB Agreement Act of 
1983 that gives the bank the power to regulate banking business on behalf 
of and in collaboration with the participating states and mandates that 
financial institutions within the member state open their books for 
inspection and verification exercises carried out by the ECCB (World 
Bank 2008) 
 The management structure of the ECCB gives insights into the 
ways that institution can actively pursue the goal of regional integration 
within the region.  The monetary council governs the ECCB, which is the 
highest decision making authority along with the board of directors.  The 
monetary council is made up of one minister appointed by each 
participating member state while the board of directors is made up of one 
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director appointed by each participating member state (www.eccb-
centralbank.org).  It is against this backdrop and with the admission of 
the bank through its mission, it can be agreed that the role of monetary 
governance through the establishment of a single monetary policy for the 
OECS presents a clear example of the ECCB accepting and playing its 
role in the regionalisation initiatives of the ECCU.  In this case, its is 
through the coordination of a monetary policy, an area of cooperation 
agreed upon by the individual member states that can best serve their 
interest and purpose. 
 The ECSC is another of the institutions of the OECS that plays a 
significant role in the regionalism project that is being undertaken.  This 
institution has as its vision statement “The achievement of 
professionalism and excellence in the timely, effective and efficient 
access to, and  administration of a cohesive, independent and 
accountable system of justice for the benefit of its Member States”.  This 
institution as in its current from dates back to 1967 and since that time 
has sought to coordinate the judicial system of the members of the OECS 
(Mitchell 2007).  This court goes beyond the interpretation of the rules of 
the organization as is the case with the European Court of Justice but 
instead goes further to perform the functions of the High Court and the 
appellate court as the supreme court of the OECS (www.eccourts.org). 
 The reality is that the ECSC was from establishment set up to be 
the Supreme Court for the islands that were colonies of Britain and as 
such were united under the British legal/judicial system that provided the 
model of its existence.  Grenade (2011) supports this when he 
commented that the ECSC was one of the institutions inherited by the 
smaller territories coming out of the failed West Indian Federation that 
failed after the independence of Jamaica, one of the largest islands of the 
region.   
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The British had from the very onset created a model of unified system 
that was used to service the region, with the judges in the initial stages 
coming from Britain, this was both a cost saving measure fro the British 
intended to pool the scarce resources of the territories and a way of 
building regional institutions (World Bank 2008).  It was therefore not by 
mere chance that the ECSC was established as the single judiciary body 
for the region as the British intended that the constitutions that were 
handed to the former colonies as they gained their independence had 
enshrined in them the supremacy of the ECSC, this was a made 
constitutional. 
 It goes without saying that with a regional court deliberating on 
matters of a municipal nature for the individual countries with the 
constitutional authority to do so the coordination of the judicial system 
was complete.  A World Bank (2008) report refers to the functioning of 
the ECSC as the outsourcing of justice to a regional institution by 
sovereign governments.  The court convenes in the various member states 
for the local assizes of that member state giving the feel of a local 
institution to that particular member state at the time since the principals 
in any matter doesn‟t have to leave their country to have matters heard at 
the court.  In this case, the court would sit at different times of the year in 
different with the same judges having the power to rule on matters of 
municipal law within the country.    
 The fact that such an institution (ECSC) exists operating in that 
manner where is has jurisdiction over local municipal matters, serving as 
a single juridical body for the member states of the OECS positively 
impacts the regionalism project as it creates one area of coordination that 
has been successfully implemented and continues to work as one of the 
leading institutions of the region.  There are safeguards in place to ensure 
the ECSC‟s independence which is enhanced by the fact that it‟s a 
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regional institution is maintained, allowing for changes to be made only 
by the agreement of all member states thus preventing any single member 
from interfering with the court‟s operations (World bank 2008).  The 
ECSC celebrated 40 years of existence and this year 2014 that institution 
would celebrate 47 years as the supreme judicial body within the OECS. 
 The final organ of the OECS that would be examined regarding its 
role in the process of regionalization is the ECCAA, which is the 
institution responsible for the regulation of civil aviation policy within 
the region.  This institution dates as far back as to 1957 when the UK the 
colonial masters at the time decided to appoint a director of civil aviation 
to advise the governments of the Leeward and Windward Islands on all 
matters relation to civil aviation (World Bank 2008).  Although not much 
literature exists on this institution even on its website except the act, this 
institution serves a very significant role in the harmonization, 
implementation and monitoring of civil aviation matters in the OECS. 
 These institutions by their very construct and functions because 
they seek to harmonise regional policy and monitor the implementation 
of these policies on a regional level with independence offered them 
through various acts and other legislation, they can be seen as 
undoubtedly playing their role in the process of regionalism in the OECS. 
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2.2 The Organs of the OECS and their role in regional governance 
 
 The Treaty of Basseterre that established the OECS in 1981 also 
established the institutions, that were later revised in the 2010 treaty and 
called organs detailing everything from the composition of these organs 
to their roles and functions.  As outlined above there are, as mandated by 
the revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) 5 organs of the OECS: The 
Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States; The Council of 
Ministers; The OECS Assembly; The Economic Affairs Council; and The 
OECS Commission.  This section would examine each of these organs 
based on the treaty and highlight their impact of any on the regionalism 
project that is the OECS. 
 The Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States, is 
the highest decision making body of the OECS.  Article 8 of the revised 
treaty of Basseterre sets of the composition and of the functions of this 
body the details of which, when understood within the context of the 
organization offers valuable insights into the impact this body has on the 
regionalism project.  According to the treaty, the OECS Authority, as it is 
commonly referred (see www.oecs.org) is made up of the Heads of 
Government of the member states.  The OECS authority among other 
things is responsible for policy making as the supreme policy making 
body and is the only body that can conclude treaties between the OECS 
and other third-party countries and organisations.  The Authority meets 
twice per year and is chaired by member states on a rotating basis 
determined alphabetically. 
 From the OECS Authority, which is the supreme body of the 
union, all other organs follow similar patterns in terms of their 
composition.  The emphasis of this section is governance, specifically 
how the organs form part of the regional governance structure.   
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All other organs are composed of representatives of the member states 
mainly at ministerial level or in the case of the OECS Commission, at 
ambassadorial level.  This is very significant since it exposes the very 
significant involvement of the individual states in the decision making 
process.  What is of not is that every policy decision or piece of 
legislation has to be approved by the Authority and the OECS 
Commission is not endowed with the type of power as conferred upon the 
European Commission.  What exists is a situation where there is 
significant inter state bargaining between the member states of the Union 
at all levels but ultimately the final decision on policy, whether initiated 
by the commission of the council of ministers, must go through the OECS 
Assembly, where the members are representatives of the local 
parliaments.  Once passed the legislation become binding on the member 
states but the Commissioners are expected to represent the OECS within 
the individual member states and engage in follow up and other exercises 
to ensure smooth implementation of Union policies. 
 It would be fair to say that the functioning of the OECS from a 
policy and even a practical functional level is heavily dependent on the 
role of the intergovernmental organs that exist to ensure governmental 
oversight at every level of policy decision with representatives of every 
member state government being present on every organ of the Union. 
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3. Neofunctionalism vs inter-governmentalism; a theoretical 
perspective 
 
 To be able to truly understand the approach towards integration 
and cooperation employed in the governance structure of the OECS, 
within the context of this study, the theories of neo-functionalism and 
inter-governmentalism need to be examined.  The aim is to determine 
whether or not elements of neofucntionalism with its neoliberal approach 
or intergovernmentalism with its focus on state bargaining, or both may 
be drawn from or be able to explain OECS integration.  It is only after a 
careful examination of both theories; comparing them and then using the 
information as the basis for the further investigation of the processes 
within the OECS can any conclusion be made about the governance 
structure of the OECS. 
 Neofunctionalism is a concept that represents a departure from the 
initially developed theory of functionalism of the 1940‟s that sought to 
create ultimately a federal Europe through undermining the functions of 
the state (Browne and Ainley, 2005).  This was because the attempts at a 
federal Europe would eventually fail owing to a lack of willingness on 
the part of states to surrender sovereignty to another body.  In this 
context, the discussion on neofunctionalism as a theory of regional 
integration would focus on the European experience since according to 
Browne and Ainley (2005) and supported by other scholars, Europe has 
been the most important testing for ideas on integration since 1945.  The 
caution is however that neofuntionalism be seen as emanating out of the 
European experience rather that a theory that can be applied to the 
integration movement taking place in Europe (Browne and Ainley 2005). 
 Moravcsik (1993) summed up neofunctionalism as a theory that 
was expected to make the integration of Europe self-sustaining through 
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spill over where the initial steps at integration would initiate internal 
economic and political cooperation that would lead to further 
cooperation.  Because neofunctionalism depended on the pooling together 
of technical functions into a central organisation, it offered the notion that 
the technocrats would assume the position of unofficial powerbrokers 
behind the scenes within governments local, regional and international.  
 The sustenance of the neofunctionalist theory is built on the 
occurrence of spill-over which according to Moravcsik (1993) occurs in 
two forms that serves to widen and deepen integration; functional spill-
over, which is economic and political spill-over which occurs when 
supranational organisations sets in motion the process of institution 
building.  Verdum (2003) agreed with this impression of 
neofunctionalism by suggesting that is was a response to functional needs 
of states that foresaw various actors; domestic, transnational and 
supranational engaging in regional integration given their relative close 
proximity and the various possibilities for cooperation. 
 In summary, neofunctionalism is primarily an attempt to offer an 
alternative to the realist school of thought towards integration that saw 
state and non-state actors actively engaging in integration through 
functional cooperation that was expected to deepen and widen as 
supranational organisations paved the way for institutional building 
(Verdum 2003).   
 Conversely, in an attempt at exposing the inconsistencies of 
neofunctionalism in explaining European integration, the realists school 
responded with a theory of its own that focused on states as the main 
actor in regional integration.  Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) commented 
that intergovernmentalists see the governments as sole mediators between 
non-state actors and EC policy-making and suggests that governments are 
also responsible for directing the process of integration and establishing 
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its limits.  Hooghe and Marks (2009) described intergovernmentalism and 
the influential alternative approach to neofunctionalism that explains 
regional integration as the outcome of bargaining among national states.  
Börzel and Risse (2009) suggested that intergvernmentalism is the 
pooling of national sovereignty rights by national governments to achieve 
more efficient policy outcomes to satisfy their domestic constituents.  The 
proponents of this theory stressed that national interest groups lobbied 
national representatives and that the interest of those groups would be 
aggregated in determining the preference of states in the decision making 
process of regionl integration.  Unlike neofunctionalism that focuses on 
the role of national, transnational and supranational actors, 
intergovernmentalism focuses on the role of the state and the influence of 
national actor on the preference formation of the state.  The assumption 
that the state is a rational actor, that there is a theory of national 
preference formation and that there is an intergovernmentalist analysis of 
interstate negotiations rests at the core of intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik 1993). 
 It is within the context of European integration, that 
intergovernmentalism is seen as offering more influence to larger states 
in the decision making process within the council of ministers, considered 
to be the institutional embodiment of interstate bargaining between treaty 
rounds within the EU (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996).  Moreover, Moravcsik 
(1995) argues that (liberal) intergovernmentalism divides the EU decision 
making into a three stage process, each explained by a different set of 
actors, he argues that the three stages are: “foreign economic policy 
formation, inter-state bargaining and institutional delegation”. 
 It is often argued within the EU context, larger more powerful states of 
Germany, France and UK for example are able to win or influence the 
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outcomes of decisions inline with the preferences of their domestic 
constituencies. 
 Both theories seek to explain the process of European integration 
but cannot agree on the main actors within the process and who or what is 
responsible for driving the process.  The difference is that 
neofunctionalism sought to explain the evolution over time of 
supranational institutions as states gradually handed over the authority of 
certain policies to supranational bodies of technocrats.  This theory of 
neofunctionalism has gradually been abandoned amidst heavy criticism 
from intergovermentalists who have worked to refine their framework 
(Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997).  On the other hand, proponents of 
intergovernmentalisn contend that the decision making and integration 
process is ultimately initiated by heads of states, supported by groups of 
ministers and advisors who see the organisation through the lens of its 
their own (national) policy preferences (Moravcsik, 1991). 
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3.1 Neo-functional approaches to integration within the OECS 
 
The section of this research would examine the OECS and those 
decision-making entities whose existence and functions appear to be 
in line with the neofunctionalist approach towards regional 
integration.  If it can be proven that there exists in the OECS elements 
of neofunctionalism, then this project would be on its way to 
answering the initial question of the type of governance structure or 
the modes of decision making within the OECS.  Examining the 
structures and functions of the various organs within the OECS and 
cross-referencing these with the literature on neofunctionalism, to 
determine if they are consistent with the literature, would do this. 
 This research begins on the premise that the organs of the OECS, 
the ECCB, the ECSC and the ECCAA present examples of 
neofunctionalism within the regionalism project of the OECS.  It is 
further suggested that these three organs are currently supranational 
bodies within the OECS that began with the intention of pooling 
functions and ended with the eventual handing over of sovereignty by 
the member states to these organisations.  Other areas would also be 
examined such as telecommunications, which followed later with the 
establishment of another regional organisation that is responsible for 
the telecommunication policy of the OECS as well as other areas of 
cooperation. 
 The establishment of a joint regional infrastructure that involved 
the creation of regional institutions for the OECS countries that was a 
direct response to financial and human constraints experienced by the 
member countries was the seed of regional integration (Ishmael 2006).  
There are further suggestions by Dr Ishmael, (former Director General 
of the OECS) that there was with the establishment of the ECCB, 
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ECSC and the ECCAA an attempt to create institutions that would 
provide specialised services in monetary policy as well as judicial and 
aviation matters respectively across the sub-region (Ishmael 2006).  
With these institutions being established to perform certain functions 
throughout the region and elements of the theory of neofunctionalism 
can be clearly seen.  In the case of the three institutions, the individual 
islands didn‟t perform the stipulated functions; rather the group of 
experts at these institutions were given the tasks of performing the 
functions on behalf of the member states that formed this regional 
grouping.   In essence, the member states of the OECS was of the 
view that the administrative functions were either difficult or 
impossible to undertake individually and hence saw integration with 
the creation of these institutions as an alternative (Barrett 1986). 
 The establishment of these three organs within the OECS seems to 
fall inline with the neofunctionalist theory that suggests the incapacity 
of public authority of individual member states to deal with certain 
functions could best be resolved by the direct initiatives of economic 
and other interest as well as regional authorities (Morgan 2000).  
These regional institutions once established, were expected to evolve 
into more powerful supranational institutions as integration deepened 
and would created pressures for further cooperation through spill-over, 
since progress in one area would give rise to pressures for integration 
in other areas (Hoogie and Marks 2009). 
 How is this theory of neofunctionalism applicable within the 
context of the OECS and the Institutions mentioned and are there 
examples of spill-over?  The institutions outlined i.e. the ECCB, the 
ECSC and the ECCAA have all evolved to become very powerful 
regional institution that although established by the member states 
exercise considerable independence over their functional areas.  
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Various legislations that establish those institutions offer protection 
from interference from individual member states and give them 
considerable power to act on behalf of participating governments.  
One example of this is outlined in the Eastern Caribbean Central bank 
Act (1983), the ECCB for example has the power to regulate banking 
business on behalf of and in collaboration with participating 
governments (Article 3, 2g).  Similar examples exist with the ECSC 
being the appellate juridical body for municipal on member states or 
the ECCAA being the regional regulator for civil aviation matters.  
Indeed as integration deepened the power and significance of these 
institutions have increased and in this regard, it can be seen that the 
emphasis with these institutions are in line with the main concern of 
the day to day policy making processes of the region (Hoogie and 
Marks 2009). 
 Having established the first part of the assumption, that being the 
existence of functional cooperation that has led to the establishment of 
supranational institutions, this section will now focus on whether or 
not, the progress in the areas examined above led to pressures of 
cooperation in other areas. 
 The revised treaty of Basseterre that established the OECS 
Economic Union lists a number of areas where the organisation intends to 
coordinate policy at a regional level.  Article 4.2 of the Treaty of 
Basseterre states the following:  
 
“In achieving the purposes of the Organisation the Member States shall 
implement decisions of the Organisation under this Treaty and otherwise 
endeavour to co-ordinate, harmonise and undertake joint actions and 
pursue joint policies particularly in the fields of – 
(a) mutual defence and security (including police and prisons); 
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(b) the judiciary and the administration of justice; 
(c) external relations including overseas representation; 
(d) international trade agreements and other external economic relations; 
(e) financial and technical assistance from external sources; 
(f) international marketing of goods and services including tourism; 
(g) external transportation and communications including civil aviation; 
(h) public administration and management; 
(i) audit; 
(j) tax administration; 
(k) regulatory and competition authorities; 
(l) education including tertiary education; 
(m) scientific, technical and cultural co-operation; 
(n) intellectual property rights; 
(o) matters relating to the sea and its resources; 
(p) telecommunications; 
(q) economic integration of the Member States through the provisions of 
the Economic UnionProtocol; 
(r) currency and central banking; 
(s) statistics; 
(t) institutional arrangements for economic consultation and information 
dissemination; 
(u) social protection mechanisms; 
(v) social policy framework; 
(w) the development of arts and culture; and 
(x) such other activities calculated to further the purposes of the 
Organisation as the Member States may from time to time decide”. 
 
 The list of policy areas is quite long and in fact some areas have 
experienced more activity than others.  For instance in the area of 
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telecommunication, the establishment of ECTEL has created 2000 is a 
clear example of spill-over in another area.  ECTEL was established to 
take the lead in the liberalisation of the telecommunication market for the 
participating member states, harmonise policy on behalf of the 
participating member states and harmonise legislation on behalf of the 
participating states (Article 4, ECTEL Treaty 2000).  The Treaty (2000) 
also mandates that the contracting states put in place the necessary legal 
and regulatory framework frame work to promote the purposes of the 
ECTEL treaty (Article 3).  This cooperation in telecommunications is one 
of the most significant examples of the spill-over to which 
neofunctionalist refer resulting from success in initial areas of functional 
cooperation. 
 Another major area of spill-over cooperation can be found in the 
establishment of the OECS/PPS among the member states of the OECS.  
This company was established in 1986 as a response to the need for 
efficiency in the procurement of pharmaceutical products.  The member 
states realised the difficulty that can be associated with small developing 
states such as theirs being able to adequately afford pharmaceutical 
products for their citizens.  In this particular case, the governments 
provided the political will and established individual “drugs account” at 
the ECCB into which they would deposit a percentage of their country‟s 
pharmaceutical budget and this would act as a revolving fund to ensure 
the prompt payment of suppliers to the OECS/PPS (www.oecs.org).   
 The OECS/PPS is responsible for the purchasing in bulk of the 
pharmaceutical products on behalf of the participating states, providing 
for them economies of scale that would not be possible if they made the 
purchases individually.  While unlike ECTEL, there is no treaty 
establishing this entity, the OECS/PPS is self-described as “a self-
financing public sector monopsony or buyers‟ cartel that covers its 
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operating cost from a 15% surcharge” (www.oecs.org).  This entity, 
while not a supranational institution (and it may or may not evolve to 
become one) is another example of the functional cooperation spill-over 
that was encouraged in an area outside of the initially outlined areas of 
policy coordination and cooperation at a regional level undertaken by the 
OECS. 
 Although the two areas of telecommunications and pharmaceutical 
procurement discussed represent the most prominent areas of spill-over 
that exists within the OECS, there are other areas that are engaged in that 
may not be as advanced or as deep in their level of 
cooperation/integration, but exist nonetheless.  Areas such as e-
government, being developed through EGRIP are expected to link all the 
member states electronically with taxation and other information.  The 
OECS Education Reform initiative, which seeks to create a region wide 
education policy that would be implemented throughout the region, offers 
another area for further and continued cooperation as the integration 
process deepens.  Other areas of functional cooperation include the OECS 
news Link, areas of environmental and energy management through 
ECERA are just a few of the other areas of functional cooperation that the 
OECS as a region has engaged in as a result of the success in the initial 
areas outlined by the treaty of Basseterre. 
 Clearly, there exists within the OECS very strong elements of 
neofunctionalism within its day to day policy making processes with both 
supranational institutions that evolved over time as the integration 
deepened as well as other areas of functional cooperation that resulted 
from the success of those initial areas of cooperation.   
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3.2 Intergovernmental Modes of Decision at the Regional Level 
 
 A study of the mode of the decision making within the OECS 
would of necessity demand an examination of the organs of the regional 
organisation since based on the treaties that established the organisation: 
The Treaty of Basseterre (1981) and the Revised Treaty of Basseterre 
(2010) most of the decision making within the organisation are left to the 
organs.  While it is true that there are independent institutions of the 
organisation that are supranational in their functioning and role, those 
powers were initially conferred on those organisations through 
agreements and/or treaties decided on by the member states of the 
organisation.  It is therefore critical to examine those organs if any 
attempts are to be made to identify if the theoretical principles of 
intergovernmentalism exits within the organisation regarding the way 
decisions are made. 
 The treaties establishing the OECS and the OECS Economic Union 
established the bodies within the organisation that are responsible for 
decision making by name, by composition and by function.  In the 
original Treaty of Basseterre (1981) the bodies with the responsibility are 
regarded as institutions and there are listed 5: The Authority of Heads of 
Governments of the Member States of the Organisations (referred to as 
the authority; The Foreign Affairs Committee; The Defence and Security 
Committee; The Economic Affairs Committee and the Central Secretariat 
(Art. 5).  In the Revised Treaty of Basseterre (2010) revisions were made 
to these bodies changing their designation to organs and replacing the 
Defence committee, the Central Secretariat, as well as the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.  In the revised treaty, the Organs of the OECS are listed as:  
The Authority of Heads of Government of Member States; The Council 
of Ministers; The OECS Assembly; The Economic Affairs Council and 
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the OECS Commission (Art. 7).  Ambassador Ellsworth John, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines‟ Commissioner to the OECS (interview, 2014) 
suggested that these revisions were made following a decision by the 
authority to streamline the implementation process within the Union.  
 This section of the research would examine the Organs of the 
OECS individually, focusing on their composition and the decision 
making process employed by each organ to determine whether or not 
elements of intergovernmentalism exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
The OECS Authority 
 
 This organ according to the Revised Treaty of Basseterre (2010) is 
the supreme policy making organ of the OECS with overall responsibility 
for the general direction and control of the performance of the functions 
of the organisation (Art. 8.4).  The Authority as it is called, is made up of 
all the heads of government of the participating member states who are 
the representatives of their individual countries (Art. 8.1).  This very 
powerful body among other things remains the ultimate authority of the 
OECS in the conclusion of international treaties with other organisations 
or third party countries on behalf of the OECS (Art. 8.13) and has 
overarching authority on the financial matters pertaining to the meeting 
of the expenses of the organisation and all financial matters of the 
organisation (Art. 8.14).  Finally, it‟s worth mentioning that the Authority 
may establish or may designate new organs within the OECS, as they 
deem necessary for achieving the purposes of the organisation (Art. 8.12).  
 Having examined the composition and some of the functions of the 
OECS Authority, it is now necessary to focus on the decision-making 
mechanism of this organisation of the OECS in an effort to determine the 
theory that best describes it.  In commenting on this, Gilmore (1985) 
stated that the real locus of power within the OECS is the authority, with 
power to make recommendations and issue directives, but most 
importantly, has the power to make binding decisions on all matters 
within its competence. 
 There seems to be differentiation made between the method used 
for arriving at what the treaty refers to as procedural matters and that used 
for other maters.  It should be noted that to arrive at decisions, matters are 
voted on at by the Authority and the treaty outlines how this should be 
done depending on the matter to be decided on.  According to Article 8.6 
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(Treaty 2010) decisions on procedural matters can be made based on a 
majority of the members present and voting at a meeting of the Authority.  
This must however be taken in the context of Art. 8.9 (Treaty 2010) that 
stipulate that decision other that procedural matters be unanimous.  On 
this issue, John (interview, 2014) informs that decisions by the Authority 
are usually arrived at by consensus and that it‟s not unusual for a single 
head of government to veto a decision he/she is not in favour with.  While 
unanimity may sometimes be an impediment to decision making, this has 
not been the cause of any major policy rift within the OECS.  The 
members of the Authority are content to deliberate until matters can be 
agreed upon in the best possible way that can attract the support through 
vote of the members of the Authority that represents the respective 
member states.  
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The Council of Ministers 
 
This organ of the OECS was established by the revised treaty of 
Basseterre (2010) and replaces the previously named Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Defence and Security Committee.  It would not be 
correct to assume that this new organ replaced those previous institutions 
of the original treaty in functions and composition, since this is not 
outlined in the new treaty.  What can be noted as similar however is that 
while in both instances the composition of both bodies is limited to 
ministers, it was very specific in the previous what ministers comprised 
those bodies, i.e. ministers of Foreign Affairs and ministers of security 
respectively. 
 The Council of Ministers as outlined by the Revised Treaty of 
Basseterre (2010) shall be comprised of ministers representing their 
member states as designated by the heads of government of the member 
states (Art. 9.1).  The difference with this organ and the previous 
institutions in the original treaty is that in this formation, the head of 
government may designate different ministers from time to time.  The 
Council of Ministers is responsible to the Authority and thus reports to 
the authority on all matters.  The Council has the responsibility for 
reporting to the Authority on recommendations of the commission and 
enacting regulations and other instruments into organisation‟s legislation 
acts enacted by the authority (Art 9). 
 Regarding decision making, the process is very similar to that of 
the OECS Authority where matters pertaining to the treaty are decided on 
through unanimous voting by the members of the council present at the 
meeting or by a majority vote on procedural matters. 
 
 
 49 
The OECS Assembly 
 
This organ is one of the new additions in the revised treaty that was 
introduced by the Revised Treaty of Basseterre (2010) to the organs of 
the OECS.  This according to John (interview 2014) was introduced to 
improve the implementation of legislation across the Union.  The OECS 
assembly as established by the Revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) is 
comprised of members of parliament or legislature of the member states 
of the Union (Art 10.1).  The number of parliamentarians elected to the 
OECS assembly is 5 and should be done in proportion to the numbers in 
the local parliament of each member state.  In the case of the OECS, the 
members of the Assembly are not directly elected by the citizens of the 
member states giving them a mandate to represent, but instead by the 
members of government and opposition in the parliament. 
 The OECS Assembly acts as a co-legislative body with the Council 
of Ministers and can recommend legislation to the Authority to be 
enacted in union legislation.  The Revised treaty of Basseterre (2010) 
outlines the functions of the OECS Assembly as follows: 
 
“The OECS Assembly shall, within such time period as the OECS 
Authority may prescribe, consider and report - (a) to the OECS Authority 
- (i) on any proposal to enact an Act of the Organization under Article 
8.10; and (ii) on any other matter referred to the OECS Assembly by the 
OECS Authority; and (b) to the Council of Ministers in the case of any 
proposal to make Regulations which has been referred to the OECS 
Assembly under Article 9.4” (Art. 10.13). 
 
 In commenting on this organ, John (interview 2014) stated that the 
establishment of this organ, the OECS Assembly was an effort to create a 
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more seamless process to the implementation of Union legislation.  Prior 
to the establishment of the OECS Assembly, Union legislation was 
implemented at various rates in different member states of the Union.  
The process of enacting legislation is such that after the Authority makes 
the legislation, it is then taken back to the individual member states 
parliaments to be enacted into the local legislations. This process 
according to John (interview 2014) occurred at differing pace and 
presented challenges for harmonization of legislation throughout the 
Union.   
 One possible reason for the implementation problems as suggested 
by John (2014) was believed to be the exclusion of the parliamentary 
opposition of the member states in the decision process allowing only for 
the heads of government of the member states to make decisions that 
affected member states.  It was believed that this lack of participation by 
the opposition led to a absence of “buy in” at the level of the local 
parliaments which served to delay the implementation process. With the 
establishment of the OECS Assembly and with members of parliament 
from both government and opposition being represented, John (interview 
2014) expressed the view that it would offer more opportunity for input 
by the local legislators from the member states, which in turn is expected 
to have a positive effect on implementation. 
 The deliberations of the OECS Assembly regarding legislation, 
having had the full participation of both government and opposition 
representation from the member states are then passed on to the Authority 
for final decision.  Acts of the OECS are automatically binding on 
member states, but having gained the approval in principle from both 
sides of the parliament of the local parliament being represented at the 
OECS assembly, better implementation at the local level of Union laws 
are expected. 
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The Economic Affairs Council 
 
 This organ established originally by the treaty of Basseterre (1981) 
is composed of ministers representing the member states as designated by 
the heads of government of each participation member state.  The 
principal function is to oversee the implementation of the Economic 
Union and report to the OECS Authority on matters concerning the 
Economic Union.  Its responsibilities are outlined in the Economic Union 
Protocol, Article 28 as follows: 
 
“The Economic Affairs Council shall be the principal organ of the 
Economic Union and shall be 
responsible for - 
(a) exercising such powers and functions as are conferred upon it by this 
Protocol; 
(b) supervising the application of this Protocol and keeping its operation 
under review; and 
(c) considering whether further action should be taken by Protocol 
Member States in order to 
promote the attainment of the objectives of the Economic Union and 
facilitating the 
establishment of closer links with other countries, groups of countries or 
international organizations”. 
 The responsibilities of the organ are quite specific to the economic 
union and but the one constant with all the organs so far is the 
representation by member states and the role(s) played by the heads of 
government in designating representatives, in each case a minister from 
his/her member state. 
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OECS Commission 
 
 The OECS Commission is the principle organ responsible for the 
general administration of the organization (Art 12.1 treaty 2010).  The 
treaty goes on to detail the composition and function of this organ with its 
responsibilities as well as outlining which organ(s) is answerable to.  
According to Article (12.2) “The OECS Commission shall comprise the 
Director-General, who shall convene and preside at meetings of the 
OECS Commission, and one Commissioner of Ambassadorial rank 
named by each Member State.  
 
A Commissioner shall, subject to Article 15.4, represent the OECS 
Commission in the Member State appointing that Commissioner” (treaty, 
2010).  The composition of this organ is consistent with that of the other 
organs discussed so far in that, it is made up selected or appointed 
representatives from the member states.  While the treaty doesn‟t openly 
state who appoints or designates the commissioner, it can be inferred, that 
the government would be responsible for making any such appointment, 
(if not directly the head of government) since the commissioner is to be 
of ambassadorial rank.  
The roles or functions of the OECS Commission are further outlined in 
the treaty in Article:  
 
12.4 “The OECS Commission’s functions shall include the provision of 
Secretariat services to the Organs of 
the Organisation, including - 
(a) servicing of meetings of the Organs of the Organisation; and 
(b) taking up action on decisions, recommendations or directives 
approved at such meetings. 
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12.5 The OECS Commission shall - 
(a) make reports of activities and an annual report to the OECS Authority 
on the work of the 
Commission; 
(b) keep the functioning of the Organisation under continuous review and 
report the findings to the 
relevant Organs; 
(c) make recommendations to the OECS Authority and the Council of 
Ministers on the making of 
Acts and Regulations of the Organisation and provide drafts of such Acts 
and Regulations to beconsidered for enactment; 
(d) monitor the implementation of Acts and Regulations of the 
Organisation; 
(e) oversee the preparation of the draft agenda for Meetings of the OECS 
Authority and submit the 
draft agenda to the OECS Authority for its approval; and 
(f) undertake such other work and studies and perform such other 
services relating to the 
functions of Organisation as may be required under this Treaty or by the 
OECS Authority or by 
any other Organ from time to time and also make proposals relating 
thereto as may assist in 
the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the 
Organisation”. 
   
 This organ according to John (interview 2014) was established to 
assist in the smooth implementation at the national level as well as to 
create a link between the member states and the OECS at the citizen 
level.  The Commissioner who represented the country at meetings of the 
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Commission was expected among other things, to oversee 
implementation of Union policy on the one hand, but also to act as an 
intermediary between the non-state actors and the Union (John, interview 
2014).   
 The purpose of examine these organs of the OECS in such detail 
was to try and determine whether or not the decision making processes at 
the level of the organs were open to elements of intergovernmentalism.  
Moravcsik (1991) refers to the inter-state bargaining made evident by the 
presence of heads of government or their nominees composing every 
organ, and the advisors to those heads of government as 
intergovernmental bargaining.   
 
In the OECS it is very clear that the individual member states are able to 
promote their preference through their representatives on each organ, 
from the Authority to the Commission.  Starting with the Head of 
Government to the Commissioner appointed each country is able to 
pursue or at least promote their national interest at the level of the OECS 
through various organs.  With the Exception of the Commission, the other 
organs made decisions that are not procedural through unanimous voting, 
this is done through simple majority on the Commission.  However, 
Commissioners are usually briefed on his/her countries position on 
particular maters that would inform the way Commissioners vote on 
issues voted on at the Commission (John, interview 2014) 
 The Organs of the OECS are clear examples of interstate 
bargaining and are composed principally for that reason.  The OECS 
Assembly for example doesn‟t have members who were elected to the 
assembly through direct elections, but instead are made up of national 
parliamentarians. These parliamentarians are principally elected to serve 
their national constituents and are always very mindful of this when 
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debating legislation at the OECS Assembly.  It would be logical to 
assume that these members of the assembly will be very concerned with 
the needs and views of their national constituents whom they are 
ultimately answerable to.  Furthermore, the inclusion of the parliamentary 
opposition as part of this organ shows further attempt of the OECS 
though the Authority to capture the full view of the national populace not 
just the government side.  Ultimately what occurs at the level of the 
Organs of the OECS that are principally the legislative and policy making 
bodies of the OECS can best be described as intergovernmental 
bargaining 
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4. The OECS and The EU: A Comparative Analysis 
 
 In this final section the research would focus on a comparative 
look at two regions; The OECS, which is under investigation on the one 
hand, and the European Union, which is widely regarded as the best 
example of new regionalism.  To undertake such an analysis is by no 
means a simple task since scholars such a Soderbaum (2008) warns that 
the lack of consensus surrounding a definition of what is a region along 
with the differing variables at play in different regional constructs pose a 
number of challenges in successfully undertaking any comparative 
regionalism study.  Be that as it may, this author will attempt to best 
show through comparison the similarities and differences in the structure 
and functioning of the two regional organisations in question with the 
hope of arriving at a determination regarding the depth of integration of 
the OECS versus the EU. 
 Hameiri (2013) warns about the difficulties of trying to comparing 
regions by suggesting that the study of comparative regionalism has been 
fraught with so many complexities and incompatible concepts that 
students of regionalism have struggled to find a method of comparison 
that goes beyond the study of institutionalisation and its relation to 
political outcomes.  Fortunately or unfortunately, this analysis would 
because of those exact reasons given take the form of a comparison of the 
intuitions and their relations to political outcomes. 
 In terms of structure, the EU unlike the OECS doesn‟t make a 
distinction between Organs and institutions.  Article 13 of the Treaty of 
the European Union lists 7 institutions of the EU: The European 
Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European 
Commission, The Court of Justice of the European Union, The European 
Central Bank and the Court of Auditors (Borchardt 2010).   
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Below would be a brief comparison of each institution of the EU with 
what is similar either in name or function within the OECS. 
 
 
European Parliament/OECS Assembly 
 
 The first EU institution that would be examined comparatively is 
the European Parliament and the OECS Assembly.  The first and most 
obvious difference with between these two bodies rests in the method 
used for selecting the members. In the case of the EU Parliament, the 
members are elected through direct EU elections while in the OECS 
Assembly; the members are selected from among existing 
parliamentarians from the national parliaments (TEU, Revised Treaty of 
Basseterre).  Plotnikova (2010)” reinforces this by stating that the 
European Parliament is the only directly elected supranational body of 
the EU that‟s elected by the citizens of the member states.  This is a 
major difference from the OECS assembly but the significance of this 
difference on member‟s behaviour will have to be the subject of another 
research.  Hix (2002) however pointed out that their voting behaviour can 
be as a result of a number of factors or preferences, which he reduced to 
three in an effort to try and understand how the members of the European 
Parliament function.  In the case of the EU, the Parliament according to 
Plotnikova (2010) referring to Orlitzky and Erakovic (2008), the main 
functions are that of legislator, supervisor of the commission and 
budgetary actor, while in the case of the OECS Assembly which is made 
of members of local parliaments from both government and opposition, 
the role is somewhat more straight forward acting as a legislative body 
that reports directly to the Authority. 
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 As stated before, there would need to be much deeper study on 
these two models of parliaments/assemblies to determine the impact of 
each model on the processes and eventual outcomes of these processes at 
regional levels.   
It must also be stated that the OECS Assembly was only established in 
2010 by the Revised Treaty of Basseterre and has only had its first sitting 
and only sitting thus far on March 26
th
 2013, hence not much would be 
available to offer a true comparison with the EU Parliament.  As for now 
what is clear is that the members of the individual parliaments of the 
OECS have a more direct involvement in the legislative process of that 
regional organisation.   
 
 
European Council/OECS Authority 
 
The European Council is made up of the heads of states or governments 
of the member states of the Union and is responsible for the general 
policy guidelines through the issuing of instructions to the Council or the 
European Commission (Borchardt 2010).  While it acts as an overarching 
institution that coordinates the policies of the entire EU (Tonge and 
Russell 2010) it doesn‟t appear to have the same power to legislate and be 
the final authority of legislative and other matters in the EU.  The tone of 
this doesn‟t echo as strong as that of the Treaty of Basseterre, which 
confers upon the OECS Authority (the comparative organ of the OECS) 
the power of supreme decision making body of the Union.  
Comparatively, the heads of government of the OECS has more direct 
influence and authority over the policy and legislative direction of the 
Union.  In the OECS, while other organs can recommend legislation, it is 
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the Authority after debate on legislations by the OECS Assembly that has 
the ultimate final say on the issues of legislation and policy.   
 Tonge and Russell (2010) goes on to suggests that other factors 
such as its minimal collaboration with civil society continue to impede 
the increase in prominence of the European Council compared to other 
institutions although this has seem some improvements recently.  To be 
fair though to the EU, for the OECS this level of cooperation and 
collaboration among heads of governments has been going on even 
before the OECS was established and was initially a requirement based 
on their status as colonies of Britain.   
Maybe having had over 50 years of this level of collaboration has made 
the Authority more adept at policy coordination on behalf of the region. 
 
 
Council of Ministers 
 
 Both regional organisations have a body referred to as the Council 
of Ministers and the composition is primarily the same in both cases.  In 
each case, the Council of Ministers is made up of ministers of 
governments of the local parliaments appointed to the Council of 
Ministers as the government decides based on the matter being discussed.  
In the case of the OECS, the Council of Ministers is a co-legislative body 
working in concert with the Commission to recommend legislation, while 
the EU‟s context sees the Council being co-legislative with the European 
Parliament. The EU seeks to have the European council and the Council 
of Ministers as the representatives of the interests of the member states 
since those two institutions are the ones where members of the national 
parliaments and/or direct representatives of national interests sit (Tonge 
and Russell 2010).  
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One difference that exists in this case is that within the OECS, the 
Council of Ministers is directly answerable to the Authority, which is 
different in the EU. 
 
 
The Commission 
 
The Commission is a name of one institution of the EU and the same for 
an organ of the OECS, but their composition and function are very 
different.  The European Commission acting essentially as the Executive 
power within the EU government, is the main institution responsible for 
the drafting of EU legislation, mediates on budgetary affairs and is the 
main face of the EU in the international arena (Russel 2010).  The 
citizens of the Union do not directly elect the members of this EU 
institution, nor are they directly selected by or appointed by their national 
governments, yet they represent national interest or at least represent 
individual member states.  According to Russell (2010) the members of 
the union are nominated by their individual member states but are then 
voted on by the European Parliament, after whose final approval, the 
Council of the EU formally appoints the members. 
 This is quite dissimilar from what pertains in the OECS as 
commissioners are appointed to the OECS Commission by their member 
governments to serve.  The OECS Commission in the OECS doesn‟t 
represent the Union internationally nor is it the face of the OECS and as 
discussed before, issues of budgeting and those of international 
agreements resides with the Authority.  The OECS Commission is not the 
primary legislative body but can suggest legislation along with the 
Council of Ministers to the OECS Assembly for debate and approval 
through voting.   
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 In this case, although the name of the institution/organ is the same 
the composition, powers and functions are quite dissimilar. 
 
 
Court of Justice of the EU/ECSC 
 
What is critical about these two institutions is not so much their 
compositions but rather their jurisdictions and their functions in their 
respective unions.  Stone Sweet (2010) that the Court of Justice of the EU 
was established by the member states in order to overcome the various 
collective actions problems associated with market and political 
integration through the enforcement of commitments made and 
enhancing the credibility of treaty commitments.  In this sense, the Court 
of Justice is principally concerned with the interpretation of union law 
and its uniformed application throughout the Union.  The Court of Justice 
is however very limited in relation to municipal matters of member states 
as if was never endowed with such powers neither by the treaty of the EU 
nor the constitutions of the individual member states. 
 The ECSC on the other hand as pointed out in previous sections is 
the regional court that combines the High Court and the OECS Court of 
Appeal for the member states.  Unlike the European Court of Justice, 
whose only jurisdiction is limited to Union law, the ECSC has 
jurisdiction on criminal matters in member states and convenes in each 
member states through the year to deliberate on municipal matters related 
to each member state.  This difference in the ECSC would suggest that 
there is a deeper level of integration within the OECS in this regard than 
the EU at least in the area of the judiciary. 
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Central Bank 
 
The Central Banks of the EU and the OECS are two of the four multi-
state central banks in existence.  These two institutions are very similar in 
their roles and functions and are primarily responsible for the monetary 
policies of their respective monetary and currency unions.  Borchardt 
(2010) referring to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(Art. 128) stated that the main purposes of the ECB are the maintenance 
of the single currency, the euro and the control of the amount of currency 
in circulation.  The ECCB also shares that function, while at the same 
time being the bank to the governments of the member states.  Both 
banks are governed by a board comprised of representatives from the 
member states of the currency union, but in the case of the OECS, there is 
a Monetary Council that is made up of the finance ministers of the 
representing each member state of the monetary currency union (or his 
designate) and this monetary council along with the board sets policy for 
the ECCB (Article 7 ECCB Act 1983). 
 The is also a difference in the way the system of Central banks is 
set up for both the OECS and the EU.  Within the EU there is a system of 
central banks with the ECB residing in Frankfurt-Maine and each 
member state of the euro zone having a corresponding central bank, 
referred to as the system of central banks (Borchardt 2010).  In the case 
of the OECS there is only one central bank located in St. Kitts and Nevis 
and branch offices located in each of the member territory that represents 
the central bank in that territory.  
 Apart from those listen above, there are also other areas of 
cooperation within the OECS that are similar to what exists within the 
EU.  For example the OECS as of August 2011 has implemented free 
movement of persons throughout the union.  According to John 
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(interview 2014) while all the administrative arrangements are not totally 
in place, those member states that are not quite ready have put temporary 
measures in place.  It must be noted here that the member states of the 
OECS which are all part of the larger CARICOM region carry a single 
passport much like the EU with the difference of the passport being that 
the particular member state‟s name is on the front of the passport for ease 
of reference.  John (interview 2014) goes on to explain that an OECS 
national travelling to at least 5 of the 7 full member territories are given a 
stamp in their passport upon arrival at immigration that indicates that the 
citizen is permitted to live and work in the country.  The exceptions are 
Antigua that currently stamps all union nationals with the same stamp 
reserved for Antiguans, while St. Kitts and Nevis is ratifying legal issues 
to make possible the implementation of the free movement of persons 
(John 2014). 
 This very brief comparison of some aspects of the EU versus some 
aspects of the OECS is by no means exhaustive; on the contrary this 
research didn‟t do much justice to the topic and believes that there is 
room for more comprehensive comparative research on both regions.  
The EU is without a doubt the most advance example of regional 
integration available, but hopefully this brief comparison can expose the 
fact that the OECS as a regional organisation is quite advance and ahead 
of most other regional organisations that exist.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Having explored the issue of regionalism in the OECS, this paper 
has first of all shown that OECS, which is a regional grouping of small 
independent island states in the Eastern Caribbean, fits the theoretical 
definition of a region as it has elements of all the definitions proposed by 
experts and specialists in the field of regionalism study.  It was proven 
that the OECS member countries apart from being in a shared geographic 
location, elements of culture, economics, politics and historical identity 
are all shared by the members of this regional organisation 
 Having established that the paper then discussed the OECS from a 
historical perspective and explored its development from the early years 
after the West Indian Federation to the actual signing of the Treaty of 
Basseterre in 1981 to the signing of the more recent Revised treaty of 
Basseterre in 2010 
 What is clear having done this research is that the OECS as a 
regional organisation is actively engaged in a regionalism project that is 
primarily a state driven processes that involves the establishment of a 
number of institutions work in tandem to develop the policy 
harmonisation, legal framework and the cooperation and collaboration 
envisaged when the original member states signed the treaty in 1981.  
There was a deliberate effort to ensure government oversight at every 
level of policy development and as such the organs of the institutions as 
were discussed have all been constructed in such a way in terms of their 
composition to ensure member state representation at every level. 
 What was realised is that the OECS cannot be described as either 
exclusively neofuntional nor exclusively intergovernmental in its 
approach to regionalism.  What was discovered is that the OECS 
embraces both methods of governance as its institutions which have 
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functional roles have evolved into vibrant independent supranational 
bodies that perform their roles without he interference of individual 
member governments, while on the other hand the organs of the OECS 
are composed in a way to ensure member state interests are represented 
and that there is robust inter-state bargaining among the members.  It 
would not be true to say that more powerful countries are able to have 
decisions skewed in their favour as is sometimes the criticism hurled at 
the more powerful members of the EU such as Germany, UK and France, 
since all the members of the OECS have similar economic peculiarities. 
 The comparison with the EU shows a greater level of inter-state 
bargaining within the OECS or at least that there is a higher degree of 
direct member state involvement at the Union level through state 
representatives on the various organs, while giving a glimpse of the 
similarities in structure and functions of the institutions/organs.  The 
OECS is neither neofunctional nor intergovernmental, it‟s a pragmatic 
mix of both to achieve the goals and objectives of the organisation.  
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